Jen Martinez points the way to an analysis of Arabist/Islamist warfighting doctrine /theory appearing in the Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute's March 2003 issue.

The article, entitled "The New Arab Way of War" is authored by Captain Peter Layton, of the Royal Australian Air Force. The piece is short, and brutal in several ways. On the other hand, it draws upon history and recent Western (particularly NATO) experience to suggest a way forward. I. EXCERPTS

Middle Eastern societies have taken stock of the Western challenge and devised an innovative, strongly asymmetrical response. Middle Eastern societies demonstrably cannot win symmetrical conflict involving Western militaries. Their "better way" inherently appears barbarous, murderous, and cruel as it is diametrically opposed to the Western approach to armed conflict.

There is, as Walter Russell Mead points out, a distinct danger to being considered "barbarous, murderous, and cruel" by an influential component of the American political landscape, namely the Jacksonians. Admittedly, I belong almost exclusively to this group, and it distinctly colors my analysis of events.

The manner of Arab warfare is intentionally designed contrary to the modern international laws of war.

To the extent that this assertion is true, I would take it and suggest as a result that perhaps we should not apply the rules of war between civilized nations, except where doing so would serve our political, military, and diplomatic interests. This is, however, currently unlikely. The problem that arises is that the transnational/global bureaucracy that I see embodied in the United Nations apparat, the International Court of Justice, and the European Union is unlikely to accept our waiver of these rules, and they will litigate, pontificate, and prevaricate accordingly. This is a concern of mine; it may not be that our leaders and those of the West will always be capable of escaping the nagging hand of Brussels or the Hague, even if engaged in legitimate acts of national self-defense. When the ranks of this aforementioned bureaucracy are filled with people hostile to our basic war aims, then a distinct political threat arises. How it is dealt with other than by pointedly ignoring it or burying them in their own treaties, I don't know.

In the modern Arab conflict style, the people, not the government, often bear responsibility, especially in situations where the central government is weak, fragmented, ineffectual, or corrupt. The West's indignation must be focused on the societies, not just the governments of the nations from which the assassins originate. Members of the societies directly or indirectly supporting attacks must understand they will be held responsible and pay a price for their support.

This is, on one hand, an attractive policy. The problem is that the communication of such a message is extremely difficult to carry out, short of invasion. Air campaigns do not seem to generate anger at the government whose action (or inaction) brought on the attacks. Rather, the air campaign (at least in Germany and other targets of USAAF/USAF bombing) tends to increase support among the populace for the target government. The lesson Captain Layton seeks to teach may be above the ken of the average citizen in al-Qaedaville, whether the government's propaganda organs take the field against the Yankee air pirates or not.

Captain Layton also has a grasp of several positive incentives that we can offer to the Arab population base. The first is nothing less than a scheming psychological effort, with an "aim...to make each individual perceive being held personally responsible and targeted for his or her support of the Arab way of war." He suggests that this effort, along with military operations elsewhere, should be implemented due to a potential socio-cultural vulnerability among the target population.

His second idea relies on the potential for stool pigeons. He theorizes that if we make support for the terrorists expensive, then there will be individuals who waver and tire of the cost. When and if that occurs, we should be positioned to welcome them with arms wide open, and take their statement. Captain Layton realizes that this strategy would probably lead to several intelligence failures---Richard Clarke, call your office---but that any tips-that-turn-out and the discord amongst terrorist leadership (Has Achmed sold us out?) would be useful. I tend to agree, because this conforms to my endorsed idea of dealing with Moqtada al-Sadr.

Captain Layton then resurrects a Cold War doctrine, that of like-type retaliation for nuclear attack:

[A] declaratory policy could be devised based on the threat of retaliation if an attack occurs in the West by nonstate actors using the Arab way of war. In such a circumstance, there could be a strategy of instant, graduated response: nuclear strikes against several of the capital cites of the Middle Eastern nations that long have demonstrated support for this method of war. The response's intensity and discrimination would vary based on the severity of the WMD attack. This approach would be a policy of deterrence through the threat of brutal and immediate punishment of particular societies.

He does, however, note that this is irrational at one level, due to the fact that peoples would be held responsible for their governments. He goes on to refute irrationality by stating that this is the same doctrine used against the Soviet Union and that,

In this new application, the citizens of several Middle Eastern nations would be held responsible for their own actions, rather than the actions of their governments. The societies' futures would be in their own hands. The sole alternative at present is preventive war; as noted, this strategy may not be sufficient, practical, sensible, or long-term.

I agree on his critique of preventive war. That strategy is highly risky; as the global political and economic fabrics seem to inexorably weave tighter, a standing policy that the rest of the world heavyweight actors disagree with could theoretically lead to some sort of sanction against the United States. If the WTO could be put to use against us as a result of our foreign policy choices, then our security aims could be thwarted and our economy damaged, with no positive offsets.

Captain Layton's approach seeks to unsettle various political, cultural, and religious elites, such as they are, in the Arab world. In other words, his policy would be based upon exacting a terrible price on their way of life if these elites did not act to prevent groups such as al-Qaeda taking action.

Yet, he does not solely offer the stick; he also has another carrot available, one that I am willing to consider as viable:

There also should be an incentive to motivate Middle Eastern societies to change their ways and be taken off the instant-response list. The Arab way of war starts in the schools and educational facilities of particular nations. Twenty years after a society stops teaching children to hate and kill, and twenty years after the last attempted terrorist attack by the members of that society, their capital should cease to be targeted.

This seems like an eminently sensible thing to at least try, but it would be something that we couldn't waffle on, and we'd have to have the resolve to see it through, even if that meant putting say Saudi Arabia "first-in-line" for retaliatory strikes. (Admittedly, OPEC might suddenly become more reasonable if they knew our strategic arsenals were pointed in their direction. That would be a fringe benefit of the highest order.)

Another perceptive point that he brings up in the footnotes is the strategic posture of these groups. He lists several potentially incompatible things, notes that all of them can't be had, but "[s]trategic coherency and consistency, or even maintenance of a defined aim, does not appear to be a feature of the new Arab conflict paradigm." This is eminently true, and it's a problem for us because maneuvering to negate one aim may in some way enable another; one is tempted to ignore their war aims and simply carry out the prosecution of our efforts. This does not, however, aim for efficiency or focus upon specific weaknesses in the Arab effort; the acceptable alternative is simply to keep slogging forward in hopes that the Arab will find himself further and further away from any of the mentioned goals.

The last excerpt goes along with what I wound up calling The Benjamin Martin Scenario:

[T]here have been many instances in Western history where patience has been exhausted suddenly and merciless, ruthless responses undertaken. The Arab way of war could yet reap this whirlwind for the Middle East if attacks by assassins go too far. History suggests this line will not be known, or even articulated, until after it is crossed. This is one of the difficulties with dealing with democracies that opposing political systems have problems comprehending.

The Islamists continue to tug at our civilizational coat, and they take their lives, along with those of their co-religionists, in their hands when they do so.

The thing that Arab national leaders and Islamic religious authorities should be worried about is that we may very well decide not to turn the other cheek some day. When that day comes, I agree with Captain Layton that it will come without warning for the Islamists. They will not hear the measured tones of George W. Bush saying 'our cause is just', speaking pleasantly of how we will be measured, careful, and discriminate. Instead, the Islamists who cheer a mushroom cloud in the continental United States may see something inspired by Hugo Weaving's Agent Smith: "Hear that, Mr. Islamist? It is the sound of re-entry vehicles en route to target; it is the sound of your civilization's death. Goodbye, Mr. Islamist."

As I wrote before, we have the weapons necessary to inflict a horrible retaliation upon the Islamists and their Islamic brethren. The willingness has not yet surfaced, but our history is replete with examples of our capacity for horrific acts. All it takes is one successful attack, the loss of a city. Then, the operative quote of the day will be as John Derbyshire put it, "Let America's enemies crow today: Tomorrow they will tremble, and weep."

In closing:

Miss Martinez asks, "[D]oes anyone have a clue? Anyone at the State Department, NSC, NSA, CIA, DOD, DOJ... the Pentagon, the White House, Congress and Senate. Do they know? Do they care??"

I'd say "Yes, Miss Martinez." I would imagine that there are policymakers and men of import who have thought these very things. However, Captain Layton's analysis may speak truth where truth cannot be spoken. I do not disparage his conclusions and his paper; rather, I would say that the public at large---the American electorate, the world community, and the transnationalists---would not stand for such a cold and unyielding view of the way forward.

In a way, it's understandable. It is difficult in this post-Cold War period to imagine that atomic weapons would move back into the forefront of security policy. Threatening nations with nuclear annihilation isn't something that should be done casually, or even deliberately on a regular basis. I personally, however, think that the circumstances of this war may eventually warrant such a policy as Captain Layton suggests. It's probably a form of latter-day brinksmanship & massive retaliation---hooray for Foster Dulles---with none of the attendant risks of a Soviet nuclear response.

Nobody wants to be the man who asks for the football carried not by a center but by a career Navy officer. I myself am highly uncertain of my ability to carry out such a threat if that duty fell to me. My theoretical response would probably model Jack Ryan's in The Bear and the Dragon, namely the doing of my duty and the prompt commission of suicide for having done that duty.

The fact that we as a society are uncomfortable threatening nuclear annihilation to whole societies is, I think, a good thing. It demonstrates that we are civilized and that we have done some growing up.

Tip of the Wisconsin hat to Jen Martinez.

Posted by: Country Pundit at 11:30 PM | No Comments | Add Comment
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