To follow up with something I agreed with in my prior post about Orson Scott Card, a quick opinion on the conduct of the security operations in Iraq:

"What To Do"

Right now, we're in a fight for the hearts and minds of Iraqis. There are two basic paths to victory I think we need to be proceeding on:

1. Restoration of a civil state. This means fix the power grid, get running water restored, and establish basic governmental services. From what I understand, we're doing pretty good on that mark. This also means the creation of a pluralistic government which does something approaching Western concepts of a limited government, instead of using its subjects for mulch. This will take some time, and it isn't a fool-proof process.

2. Secure the Iraqi people. The model for here came to me in the context of gangsters. Moral arguments about using gangsters aside, it seems like a useful framework to proceed. Basically, what we've done is knock off the neighborhood thug, like opposing interests tried to do to Don Corleone in the early sequences of The Godfather. However, our Corleone, Saddam Hussein, still has his men running around trying to keep fragments of his power.

We must treat the situation over there as if we're the new guys muscling in, because that's exactly what we are. That means that we've got to be tough about the old guys, and we've got to win the loyalty of the people. How do you win loyalty? A simple exchange: You, the new boss, make it worth the people's while to be loyal to you. Essentially, it boils down to protection. We must protect the people of Iraq from Saddam's enforcers.

At some level, Baathist thugs are probably running around saying things like, "Saddam hears all! Saddam remembers your loyalty to him/disloyalty to him!" Well, fine. Let him hear everything---hopefully what he hears will be "Eff you" in Arabic. I read somewhere on the 'net that graffiti was being seen now that said, in a message to Iraqi children, "The hand that waves to Americans will be the hand that is cut off", approximately. This is utter barbarism, and we have seen it before, in the steaming jungles of Southeast Asia practiced by the Viet Cong. More on that later.

One thing that I keep hearing that the Iraqis are afraid of is the return of Saddam. Given the stakes, their fear is justified. What we do about that fear is demonstrate conclusively that the game is over and that Saddam Hussein is no Comeback Kid. No amounts of 'Hail Usay' passes are going to work.

Given what I see as the realities of the situation, the way to do the above is through a systematic application of two things: Protection, for the common people of Iraq, and annihilation for the soldiers of Saddam.¹

Protection and annihilation comes from one thing: Clearly and unequivocal establishment of the fact that any attempt to enforce the writ of Saddam leads to the rapid and inescapable death of his enforcers. How do we do this? By protecting the people.

The Iraqi people are roughly in the position of the undertaker who comes to Corleone and asks for things to be made right with respect to his, the undertaker's, daughter. How did Corleone respond? He said "Yes". The man was loyal after that, to the point of working on Sonny Corleone's body after his murder. This is our opportunity.

When the local Baathist thug decides that he's going to threaten a citizen, that citizen should be able to come to the nearest American (or the Iraqi Police) installation and ask for protection. When he asks, he will be told "yes", with the only questions being asked are the ones that get our troops in position. We ought to promise his protection in exchange for his loyalty.

When Saddam's thugs show up, the United States Army meets them at the door and instantly introduces the Baathists to the consequences of meddling with our people. Drag the bodies of the Baathists out in the street and announce loudly that anyone who tries to enforce Saddam's law will meet the same fate. Repeat this throughout the land, and I think you'll see a change for the better in Iraq.

Otherwise, we're leaving these poor people to suffer the fate of Vietnamese villagers who were brutalized into cooperation with the North Vietnamese. We'd come by and offer food, shelter, and things like that if the villagers would help. The Viet Cong came by and disemboweled, raped, tortured, and murdered whoever they suspected of being less than 100% in Uncle Ho's corner. That we didn't engage in systematic and similarly single-minded defense of these villagers is probably something we'll answer for some day. We have an opportunity in Iraq to erase a mistake of Vietnam in that respect, and I hope America takes it.

A two-fold message must be delivered: To the Iraqi people and the world at large, "Sic semper Baathists". To the Baathists themselves, "Your time is over, and you leave with nothing."

This is not a perfect strategy, and it's downright dangerous at some levels. I do, however, think that if America is willing to make things expensive for Saddam's thugs, the Baathists will find a curious shortage of men willing to go canvassing for terror. Hopefully, the intelligence deficit I hear our commanders suggesting as the big problem right now will dry up if we give it a reason to. Similarly, it is possible that the spectacle of American troops being mutilated after their deaths might not be repeated---citizens wholly loyal to us and the new government would not tolerate an act likely to anger their benefactors.

I don't suggest this because I'm particularly a fan of the mafia. I suggest it because I want our troops home and I want a stable, republican Iraq² to join the community of nations. The only way to those ends is through the roadblock we call 'Saddam Hussein'. I suggest we remove that roadblock with as much force as we can muster.

¹ By "soldiers of Saddam", I mean those fighting under his name now; I don't really care about the late Iraqi army in terms of this discussion.

² Admittedly, I heard an interesting proposal yesterday on National Public Radio, submitted by the chief foreign correspondent for the New York Times, one that suggested segmenting Iraq into three separate states, comprised primarily of Kurds, Shiites, and Sunnis, respectively. I haven't read his article yet, but I'm generally fond of the idea of fixing the mistakes of partition made 75-odd years ago or more.

Posted by: Country Pundit at 02:18 AM | Comments (1) | Add Comment
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